Roy B. Morgan, Senior Judge (Effective September 1, 2022)
Reports of Cases Reviewed by Appellate Courts – Beginning Jan. 1, 2022
Text is the appellate court’s summary of the opinion.
Scroll down for important information.
State of Tennessee v. Washington, W2022-01201-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2023). The Defendant, Ambreia Washington, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; resisting arrest, a Class B mis-demeanor; and driving with a canceled, suspended or revoked license (second offense), a Class A misdemeanor, for which he received an effective fifteen-year sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307 (2018) (subsequently amended) (unlawful possession of weapon), 39-16-602 (2018) (resisting arrest), 55-50-504 (2020) (canceled, suspended or revoked license). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, failing to dismiss the indictment due to missing evidence, admitting certain photographs into evidence at trial, and denying a motion for amistrial as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. The Defendant also contends that the cumulative nature of the errors warrant relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
State of Tennessee v. Johnson, W2022-01041-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2023). A Madison County jury convicted the Appellant, Nicolas Wayna Johnson, of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver (counts one and two), possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony (counts three and four), theft of property up to $1,000 (count five), and possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia (count six). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged counts one and two and imposed a concurrent sentence of two years. The trial court also merged counts three and four and imposed a sentence of three years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. By operation of law, the trial court ordered the concurrent two year term for counts one and two to be served consecutively to the three-year term in counts three and four. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(a), (e)(1), (g)(1). For counts five and six, the trial court imposed a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served concurrently with all other counts, for an effective sentence of five years in confinement. The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying alternative sentencing. Because the Appellant was eligible for probation on the theft and drug-related offenses, we remand for resentencing.
State of Tennessee v. Armstrong, W2022-01397-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2023). A Madison County jury convicted Defendant, Brian Allen Armstrong, of two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective term of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his requested jury instruction on the defense of necessity. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Hayes Family Partnership v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., No. W2022-01209-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2023). This is an insurance policy coverage dispute between Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”) and its insured, Hayes Family Partnership (“Hayes”). At issue is property damage to a commercial building owned by Hayes and insured by Tennessee Farmers. The damage, which was in excess of two hundred thousand dollars,was caused by a third-party tortfeasor, George Hardey, who drove his vehicle into the insured building. Shortly after the accident and without the knowledge or consent of Tennessee Farmers, Hayes executed a release of all claims against Hardey and his insurer, Allstate Property & Casualty Company (“Allstate”), in consideration for the $25,000 policy limits paid by Allstate. After Hayes submitted its claim to Tennessee Farmers for benefits under its policy, Tennessee Farmers denied Hayes’ claim based on Hayes’ violations of material provisions in the insurance policy, including the provision that required Hayes to “do everything necessary to secure [Tennessee Farmers’] rights” and “do nothing after loss to impair them.” The trial court denied Tennessee Farmers’ Motion for Summary Judgment based, in part, on the “made whole” doctrine, and it ruled that “the release executed by Hayes in favor of the third-party tortfeasor George Hardey does not foreclose Hayes’ right to pursue recovery from Tennessee Farmers.” The trial court also reasoned that TennesseeFarmers may not avoid coverage “on the basis of breach of the insurance policy condition that its insured must do everything necessary to secure its rights and nothing to impair those rights, and Hayes[’] release of Hardey.” The trial court then granted Tennessee Farmers’ motion for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, which we also granted. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Hayes forfeited its right to coverage under the Tennessee Farmers’ policy by, inter alia, releasing all of Hayes’ claims against the third-party tortfeasor and his insurance company without the knowledge or consent of Tennessee Farmers. We have determined that Hayes materially breached the insurance policy by releasing the third-party tortfeasor and his insurer from liability without the consent of Tennessee Farmers; therefore, Tennessee Farmers was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand with instructions to summarily dismiss the complaint.
State of Tennessee v. Clark, W2022-01372-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2023). The pro se Petitioner, Charles Anderson Clark, Jr., appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Madison Holdings, LLC v. The Cato Corporation, No. W2022-00685-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2023). In litigation commenced by landlord to recover unpaid rent, the tenant asserted a counterclaim alleging violations of the parties’ lease agreement and seeking a declaration of the parties’ rights and obligations. Featuring prominently in the parties’ dispute is a lease provision providing for, among other things, rent abatement if a non-party to this litigation, the designated “Major Anchor Tenant,” ceases operations in the shopping center where the tenant’s store is located. Under another lease provision, which is also at issue, the right to rent abatement is triggered, subject to certain exceptions, if landlord enters into another lease agreement “with or by any national or regional tenant having . . . more than one store for whom the majority of its revenue is from the sale of apparel and/or clothing accessories.” In this case, the tenant has asserted rights to relief with respect to both of these provisions. Following a bench trial, the trial court rejected various defenses raised by landlord in the litigation and determined that the tenant was entitled to relief under the parties’ lease. As part of its order, the trial court awarded the tenant a monetary judgmentagainst landlord related to rent overpayments the tenant had made during a period when rent abatement was in effect. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding a monetary judgment related to the rent overpayments given that the remedy provided under the relevant lease provision specifically provides only for an offset against current or future rent, we otherwise affirm the trial court’s order in this case.
Wiesmueller v. Oliver, No. M2023-00651-COA-T10B-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19,2023). This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to § 2.02 of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.
Golden v. State of Tennessee, W2022-00388-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2023). The Petitioner, Kelvin Dewayne Golden, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for rape of a child. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to argue to the trial court that the indictment was inconsistent with the charged jury instructions, (2) failing to utilize impeachment evidence through the use of expert witnesses, (3) failing to properly investigate the case, (4) failing to hire a private investigator and medical expert to review physical or DNA evidence, and (5) failing to utilize the victim’s psychological records to impeach the victim. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Carter v. State of Tennessee, W2022-00474-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 9, 2022). In 2008, a Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Newt Carter, of aggravated rape and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years. Multiple filings ensued, the last of which was a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. The trial court held a hearing and denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his motion to reopen should have been granted based on newly discovered evidence that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we dismiss the appeal.
Champion v. State of Tennessee, W2021-01392-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2022). The Petitioner, Dwight Twarn Champion, was tried jointly with his co-defendant and was convicted of facilitation of criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with a weight of 0.5 grams or more with intent to sell, facilitation of criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with a weight of 0.5 grams or more with intent to deliver, and possession of marijuana, for which he received an effective twelve-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a motion to suppress, interview one of the State’s witnesses, investigate the precise location of a black plastic bag containing drugs found outside the home, cross-examine one of the State’s witnesses, and file a motion to sever the Petitioner’s trial from his co-defendant’s trial. The post-conviction court denied the petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.
State of Tennessee v. Bohanan, Jr., W2021-00242-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2022). Glenn Bohanan, Jr., Defendant, was charged with one count of rape of a child, three counts of rape, and four counts of incest, for events that took place over the span of several years. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of all counts of the indictment and sentenced to an effective sentence of 40 years. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for rape of a child in Count 1, rape in Counts 3 and 4, and incest in Counts 5-8 because the victim did not testify specifically that Defendant penetrated her on each occasion; and (2) the sentence is excessive. After a review of the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Bates v. State of Tennessee, W2021-01293-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2022). The Petitioner, Breyon Bates, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
State of Tennessee v. Baker, No. W2021-00498-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. July 5 , 2022). The defendant, Dana Baker, challenges his Madison County Circuit Court convictions of one count of assault, see T.C.A. § 39-13-101(a)(1), and one count of obstructing or preventing the service of process, see id. § 39-16-602(c), on grounds that an alleged Fourth Amendment violation prohibited his convictions and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Because the evidence was insufficient to support either of the defendant’s convictions, the convictions are reversed, and the charges are dismissed. Dissent by Judge Easter.
State of Tennessee v. Blackman, No. W2020-01696-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2022). The Appellant, Desean Allen Blackman, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received concurrent nine-year sentences to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by allowing a law enforcement officer to testify that the Appellant invoked his right not to speak with the officer. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. We also conclude that the trial court erred but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
State of Tennessee v. Rose, No. W2021-00995-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. rim. AppCJune 1, 2022). Defendant, Kacy Rose, appeals from the revocation of his probationary sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider a potential conflict of interest, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct a clerical error in the order revoking Defendant’s probation, and (3) his right to a speedy trial was violated. Following our review of the record and briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Goff v. State of Tennessee, No. W2021-00929-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. June 1, 2022). The petitioner, Gregory Arnez Goff, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.
State of Tennessee v. Collins, No. W2020-01566-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. April 21, 2022). Defendant, Quincy Lamont Collins, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for one count each of attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, especially aggravated robbery, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged, and he received an effective sentence of 31 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; that the trial court should have suppressed the gun located as a result of information obtained during Defendant’s interrogation; that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; and that his convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault violate double jeopardy. Following our careful review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Cole v. State of Tennessee, No. W2021-00973-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. April 11, 2022). The Petitioner, Markist Cole, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that due process considerations warranted the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.
Michael Wayne Robinson v. State of Tennessee, No. W2021-00886-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. March 31, 2022). The Petitioner, Michael Wayne Robinson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a weapon, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
James A. McCurry v. State of Tennessee, No. W2021-00130-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. March 16, 2022). Petitioner, James A. McCurry, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
State of Tennessee v. Lance White, No. W2020-01367-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2022). The Appellant, Lance White, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of various offenses, including driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, and received an effective six-year sentence to be served as eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement followed by five years on supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s probation, and the Appellant filed a “Motion to Correct Sentence.” The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant appeals. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.
Jeremy C. Koffman v. Madison County Tennessee ET AL., No. W2021-00385-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2022). In this case, which stemmed from an attack on an inmate at a county jail, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the Defendants. Among other things, the trial court concluded that the assault on the inmate was not foreseeable. We affirm.
Understanding the Limitations and Use of the Information Found in This Book
Tennessee’s trial judges resolve hundreds of thousands of legal and factual issues in tens of thousands of cases every single year. No appeal is filed in the vast percentage of those cases, indicating that while the “losing” party may not like a ruling on a particular issue, that party understands there was an appropriate reason for the judge’s decision or, at a minimum, the judge was acting within his or her discretion.
Of course, a small number of decisions of trial judges do result in an appeal. Experienced trial lawyers know that the number of cases appealed out of a particular trial judge’s court does not, in and of itself, reveal much about the trial judge. For example, some judges hear more complex cases than others, and those cases are more likely to be appealed. Convictions in child sex abuse cases are frequently appealed, as are many criminal cases resulting in long sentences. There are a large number of parental rights termination cases that find their way to the appellate courts. Judges who routinely try those types of cases will, other things being equal, see more of their cases reviewed by appellate courts than judges who do not see such cases.
Second, certain litigants (and certain lawyers) are more likely to appeal a case than others. Thus, judges who have those litigants or lawyers regularly appear in their courtrooms will find more cases reviewed by the appellate courts.
For these and other reasons, the reader is cautioned not to read too much into the number of cases appealed from a court. Stated differently, there is no reason to believe that a judge who has ten cases reviewed by an appellate court in a single year is a “worse” judge than one who has one case appealed, or that a judge who has three cases appealed is a “better” judge than one who has nine cases appealed.
Next, the number of times a judge’s ruling is reversed by an appellate court is not necessarily indicative of the quality of his or her work. For example, experienced lawyers know that there are “holes in the law,” i.e., cases where there is no law directly on point and the judge is forced to predict what an appellate court would rule on the issue. The fact that a judge decided an open legal issue one way and an appellate court decided it another way does not mean that the trial judge was “wrong” or does not understand the law. It simply means that the trial judge had a different view of what the law should be than the appellate court that decided the issue. A trial judge is not blessed with a crystal ball that can with 100 percent accuracy forecast how an appellate court will rule on an undecided legal issue.
In addition, the trial court is sometimes not provided with the same in-depth legal arguments and law that is supplied to the appellate court by the parties, or which is provided by law clerks at the appellate level (many trial courts do not have law clerks). The trial judge may have reached the same conclusion as the appellate court if he or she had been supplied with additional law or argument.
Finally, the law changes constantly, and the trial judge may rule on a case based on today’s law, which may evolve between the time of that ruling and the issuance of an opinion of the appellate court. In such cases, the reversal of the case by the appellate court is a question of timing of the original court decision as compared to changes in the law, not one of error by the trial court.
So, what is the value of this book? How can the trial lawyer use it to help his or her clients given the limitations expressed above? Permit me to digress slightly.
You have seen the coffee cups or t-shirts that proclaim, “A good lawyer knows the law, but a great lawyer knows the judge.”
Some read this phrase as suggesting that the “great lawyer” is one who has an improper relationship with the judge – that he or she can use a personal relationship to improperly influence the judge. But most lawyers know better. Most lawyers understand that “knowing the judge” means knowing the judge’s background, preferences concerning the presentation of evidence (including exhibits), arguments of motions, drafting of proposed orders, and given that experience, how he or she is likely to rule on a particular issue. “Knowing the judge” also means knowing the local rules, local forms, local customs, and what things irritate the judge (and every judge is irritated by at least one thing that lawyers or litigants may do).
Many lawyers, particularly those in more rural areas of the state or who limit their practice to one area of law, understand the personality and preferences of the judges they see on a regular basis. Many of these lawyers may have a fair advantage appearing before that judge. (The advantage is “fair” because it results from experience and knowledge.) That advantage – knowing how the judge thinks and his or her preferences – is not outcome-determinative, but it still may be an advantage, similar to a sports team playing on their home field.
Why did I say it “may” be an advantage, given what I said earlier about the benefits of “knowing the judge?” Because simply knowing the judge’s thought processes and preferences is not enough. You still need to have the law and the facts on your client’s side. And you need to be prepared to be able to give the judge what he or she needs to know to make a ruling.
So, the purpose of “The Book” is to give Tennessee lawyers case-related information to help them understand the trial judge who will rule on their client’s case or preside over a jury trial. By looking at past appellate court rulings arising from cases decided by the trial judge, anyone unfamiliar with a judge can get a “feel” for the judge. The case data contained herein does not compare with daily or weekly appearances in front of the judge on issues like a given case, but it is readily available information that give you an idea of how the judge has ruled in the past on a variety of matters.
The cases included are those originally decided by the trial judge that were in appellate court opinions released on or after January 1, 2022. Note that there are a substantial number of judges who first took office in 2022 and thus it is reasonable to assume that there will be no appellate decisions for such judges until late 2023 or 2024.
